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*THE SYNOPTIC MIND: AN IDEAL OF LEADERSHIP*

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To be able to reflect the mind and sentiment of one's own generation and be the interpreter of its aspirations is a great thing, but to succeed in giving to a noble and enduring ideal of humanity its classic expression, to voice clearly the deepest needs and highest dreams of many centuries, is the supreme performance, which is beyond the power of all but the few geniuses who are large enough to represent our race. Of all the saints, sages, and saviours who have studied the drama of human life, no one has ever surveyed it from a greater height than Plato, nor has any mind surpassed his in comprehensiveness and insight. And his conclusion, his matured conviction, was that humanity's most urgent need is for adequate leadership. The goal of the ideal system of education which is outlined in the Republic was the discovery, selection, and training of what he calls "synoptic-minded men" to be the leaders of the state. The youths to be prepared for this high function were first to be selected from those apparently most promising, and then submitted to a course of physical and mental discipline lasting through the greater part of life. This was a sifting process, and from time to time the failures were dropped. The finer natures continued their elementary studies till the age of twenty, when they were submitted to a new test of their capacity for leadership. Up to that time their manner of study was to be appropriate to youth. Their knowledge, being necessarily a mass of unconnected and unrelated fragments, could not be embraced in a unitary view. But when the synthetic powers ripen, the time arrives to attempt an organization of the mental content, to put together the things that have been, and are being, learned, and comprehensiveness becomes an ideal of the mind.

Plato's statement is as follows: "The sciences which they have learned in their early education without any order will now be

brought together, and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to one another and to true being." The Greek word for the ideal aimed at is *σύνοψις*; that is, these hitherto unrelated subjects will be combined into a synoptic view. The possession of a talent for doing this, of a synoptic mind, is the criterion by which selection is to be made for still higher advancement. Plato has another name for minds of this type; indeed, he generally calls them "dialectical," but he explicitly states that in his usage the two words mean exactly the same thing, and his whole theory of education is based on his conviction that only those minds that possess the capacity for putting things together in a comprehensive view and thus seeing them in their natural relations are fitted for the higher studies which equip men for leadership.

The experience of the ages has confirmed the insight of this famous thinker. That one of the greatest needs of humanity is for a supply of synoptic-minded men to manage its affairs and direct its development is as nearly an unquestioned truth as we are likely to meet with in these critical days. And it is of the most profound and even vital significance for all who are set to be leaders, and not least for the ministers of liberal churches. There are those who look to us for guidance in the conduct of the greatest and highest of human interests. It is not only our privilege, but our business, to be men with a cosmic outlook, and to strive toward a comprehensive and unitary view, even though it must necessarily be tentative and incomplete; and, while no one can reach the height of Plato's ideal for the philosopher and be a "spectator of all time and existence," we can and ought to have some sense of the frame in which our human life is set, to look down the long vistas of evolution, and attain to some inspiring conception of our place in the great process, of the achievements of the past, and of humanity's reasonable hopes for the future.

And how sublime is the vast drama! Science cannot fill out the details, but its outlines of the magnificent scheme are doubtless something like the truth. Standing by the seashore last summer, my imagination vainly tried to picture what I know must have taken place,—the living jelly coming out of the water, organizing itself, multiplying and specializing its cells, acquiring

skeleton, organs of sense and locomotion, nervous system and brain, until distinctively human activities appear and humanity with its advancing intellectual, moral, social, and religious life is an established fact on the earth.

And because the great process is still going on, because in us it has become self-conscious, because humanity is not only being pushed up by cosmic forces as formerly, but is now also deliberately climbing up, striving toward its native ideals and thus co-operating in its own evolution, because it is in need of leaders who can help to clarify its thoughts and bring into distinct consciousness the noble ideals that lie implicitly but obscurely in its heart, the moral and religious teacher has a work to do, a work which he can hope to perform successfully only as he is a man whose habit of mind is comprehensive and synoptic, and whose ideal and constant effort is to see life sanely and see it whole. I venture, then, to offer some thoughts on the present situation, and to suggest an answer to the question, What o'clock is it in the evolution of human life? For, I think it safe to assume, what we are chiefly interested in is not religion only, but the evolution of human life on this planet. It is not possible to detach the religious aspect of life from the rest of it, since religious thought and feeling are the blossoming, the outflowering of the whole process. The higher life must be cultivated, as indeed it must be lived, as one life. And if I emphasize the intellectual phase of this higher life, it is because this emphasis seems at present to be sorely needed. The philosophers and religious writers of today vie with one another in exalting the importance of the voluntaristic aspect of our human existence, and in disparaging the activity of the seeker for truth who loves it for its own sake as well as for its uses, who believes with the noblest minds of all ages that the knowledge of truth is a good in itself, that *θεωρία* is one of the natural goals of human striving. A flood of books, essays and sermons, is coming from the press the avowed purpose of which is to establish the irrational and, in practice, largely immoral principle of the "will to believe," that is, to justify the procedure of those who assume to be true any mystical or irrational doctrine which they may conjecture to be of help in the business of life.

Jesus is said to have looked on the multitudes with compassion, regarding them as sheep without a shepherd. The situation has improved somewhat, but the multitudes need compassion still. Many of its leaders have lost their way, and are seeking in the bogs of pragmatism and other forms of anti-philosophy for humanity's highway. Some have even given up rational ideals, and profess no longer to believe that the universe is an order the truth of which it is possible for us to know. To understand how this disqualifies them for leadership, it is only necessary to remember that all inspiring preaching, every message that has ennobled the lives of men, has been marked by two characteristics, namely, faith in the worth of human nature and in the reality of truth.

In order to make it perfectly clear that the greatest need of our excessively specialized and subdivided modern life is for synoptic-minded men, it is necessary to consider in the large the development of humanity's higher life as it appears from the point of view of the philosophical psychologist. Other classifications may, of course, be made by those who have other interests at heart, but I think it will be recognized that the picture to be presented is no mere fancy of mine, but that what I am saying the facts themselves say to all who can appreciate their significance.

There are, then, three great stages in the evolution of thought, namely:—

1. The primitive confused awareness.
2. The clearing up of this confusion through the making of distinctions.
3. The synoptic view in which the things distinguished are seen together.

The first stage need not detain us long. Everyone who has studied the history of thought knows that distinctions which are familiar to us were not made in ancient times. Thus there was a period when the problem of the relation of mind and body had not arisen because these two aspects of reality were not yet clearly distinguished. Matter and spirit were regarded as different forms of a single substance. "Whatever acts is body," it was said. "Mind is the subtlest form of body, but it is body nevertheless." The soul-atoms were thought to differ from those

of the body only in being very small and smooth and not in fundamental nature. The problem of interaction, therefore, presented no special difficulty. Early theories of exorcism and baptism betray this confusion of conceptions. As Edwin Hatch has shown, it was imagined "that demons might be the direct cause of diseases because the extreme tenuity of their substance enabled them to enter, and to exercise a malignant influence upon, the bodies of men. So water, when exorcised from all the evil influences that might reside in it, actually cleansed the soul. The conception of the process as symbolical came with the growth of later ideas of the relation of matter to spirit. It is, so to speak, a rationalizing explanation of a conception which the world was tending to outgrow."

In the course of time problems are disentangled. Matter came to be thought of as that which has extension and weight, and mind as that which thinks and feels. This was a great advance, and this differentiation is a necessary step in mental progress. But at this stage a new difficulty arose. Men fell into the error of supposing that things which they can distinguish in thought are in fact separate, or even opposed. They made their useful distinctions too absolute, and the evil consequences, for practical life as well as for the understanding, immediately appeared. The differences between the various aspects of human life were exaggerated until they appeared to be antagonisms, and men took it for granted that if they chose the one they must reject the other. And so we have the spectacle of the saints, in both the Christian and non-Christian worlds, identifying themselves with the part of life which they considered noblest, and despising and mistreating and occasionally, from a different application of the same logic, even indulging their bodies. The horrors of asceticism and the bestiality in which it not seldom ends are familiar, and to describe them here would serve no good purpose. What is useful, however, is to see that the logic of asceticism is simple. Since the body is not the soul, and since the two are opposed, let us mortify the deeds of the flesh. Or, in the other case, since the body has nothing to do with the soul, let the swine feast and satisfy its base nature.

History shows that the result of overdoing this useful distinc-

tion between body and mind is always the desert, physical, mental, and moral. Specialization and differentiation are necessary phases of intellectual progress, but not its goal. It is necessary to go on to organization, to keep clear the things that have been shown to be different, and yet to think them together in their natural unity. While it is a great advantage to the physiologist to be able to study bodily processes without troubling himself about the mental life, and to the psychologist to be free to investigate psychic processes pure and simple, it must never be forgotten that the two sets of processes are actually very closely related, that mental and nervous life do in fact go on together, and are both parts of the real, concrete life that we know. The goal of thinking is the comprehensive view of the synthetic mind. No other view is true, and every other view leads to bad results in practical life. And today there are evidences that this is being felt, witness the growing recognition of the fact that there are psychic factors in health and physical factors in morals. We are beginning to see clearly the truths which the old Greeks felt when they treated life as one. In the education of their youth, gymnastic was not merely for the body nor was music exclusively for the soul, but both were for both.

Hegel saw this clearly enough in his day, but the form in which he cast his thought, his rigid scheme, and his defects as a writer make it easier to condemn him off-hand than to appreciate his great, fruitful conceptions, which may easily be stated in a simpler and more intelligible way. His vision was perfectly clear. He saw that the distinctions which we find it useful and necessary to make are not absolute, that life includes tendencies that seem opposite, and that it is thus larger than the logic of acute and consistent, but narrow, minds, and that to see life sanely and do justice to all the phases of its development requires what may be called the dialectic, synoptic, synthetic, or comprehensive mind.

What a pity that Hegel's power of clear exposition was not equal to his insight, and how much we need his message in the United States today, in spite of the progress of the last eighty years! For minds with the requisite scope are still rare. Even our leaders are for the most partisans. As Emerson said, each

sees but one aspect of the total situation, and it generally takes two to make a man. Nor is the case very different with our intellectual *élite*. Their specialization is usually so extreme and exclusive that although they know their subjects, they do not see them in perspective and in their larger relations, the result being that they are all too often poor teachers. How rare it is to find a mind able to take the results of investigation in one department, and unite them with the truths reached by workers in other fields! The ideal is to carry specialization to the utmost and then to organize the truth discovered into a unitary view, that is, not to leave the materials of the house of thought lying around in separate heaps, but to build, to think together again, without blurring them, the things that science has distinguished, but which after all have their place in the organic unity of the living whole.

In Plato's phrase, the opposite of the ideally organized mind, the comprehensive intelligence, is the "crippled soul." This is his name for the imperfect, deformed creature whose scope of vision is so limited that it can embrace but one aspect of our many-sided life. And no doubt the Greek thinker would have accepted Muirhead's definition of philosophy as a "lifelong struggle with one-sided ideas of life." One who meets many highly educated men must often be struck with the felicity of the term "crippled souls." Each man seems to rationalize but a small section of his mind. In some regions he is mature, in others he is about five years old. An eminent naturalist will tell us that he has communicated with the dead, or a fine mind like that of Maeterlinck, able to produce the beautiful essay on "Sincerity", or that on "The Dog", will also profess belief in childish superstitions, such as those set forth in the essays entitled "The Star" and "The Pre-destined."

And here it is well to consider that, if comparatively few have attained to the third stage of intelligence, this is but natural, for the work of distinction-making is by no means ended. Our thought is still too much of a blur, and our problems too complex and in need of disentangling. For instance, one reason for the frequent failure of educational methods is the lingering error that each child has a number of faculties, such as memory and



reason, which, it is supposed, may be developed by discipline. The truth is that these distinctions are crude in the extreme, and that the mind is a name for a vast number of specialized capacities. Strictly speaking, we have, not a memory, but a multitude of memories, good, bad, and indifferent, and we find that men generally reason well about the things which they have studied, but that their judgment is not to be trusted when the subject under consideration is unfamiliar. This discovery dissipates into thin air the notion of formal discipline, and is of the greatest importance for the art of education and for correct judgment of the characters and capacities of men. Many such useful distinctions are doubtless yet to be made, for our natures are far more complex than was formerly supposed. The psychologists are showing that below the threshold of consciousness great numbers of tendencies, memories, fears, and longings live and work, either singly or in associative systems, that they affect our disposition and sometimes our health. We have as yet by no means been able to take stock of all that is in the obscure reservoir of life, and it will be a long time before we can say of any psychologist what the author of the Fourth Gospel said of Jesus, that "he knew what was in man." Just now this truth needs to be emphasized, but ere long, in virtue of our constitutional tendency to excess, we shall probably have to protest against its overstatement, and to recall the fact that the mind, in spite of the abundance of its organized reactions and special capacities, has a certain unity after all.

This tendency to hypostatize distinctions is one of the chief characteristics of popular thinking. There are, for example, many people who are sufficiently developed to appreciate the importance of moral education and who become in consequence its ardent promoters. But they usually proceed on the false assumption that because the instruction given in the public schools and colleges is predominantly intellectual, it is without any moral result, and that it needs to be supplemented by an education that is purely ethical. But of course only those who linger in the second stage of intellectual development can think in this way. Education is one, and, while its aspects may be distinguished, it cannot be actually separated into independent

parts. There is no purely intellectual education, no moral or religious education which is just that and nothing else. The habits of study, order, neatness, punctuality, accuracy, thoroughness, politeness, and co-operation, which are developed in school life because they are its necessary conditions, are all moral. So with all instruction in history and literature that goes beyond the most elementary stages. As the student proceeds, his intellectual interests are awakened, the spirit of the great writers touches his spirit, he catches something of their enthusiasm for noble ideals, his horizon is enlarged, and he is enabled to observe the effects of good and bad actions as illustrated on the stage of the world, and this is only another way of saying that he is being built up in his moral life. To fail to see this truth, and to suppose that the moral is a separate or separable section of life which can be advanced only through the reading of a particular book or through instruction which is "purely moral," is to misunderstand, and so to be incapable of adequately meeting, the real situation.

In this respect, however, the people are not sinners above many who speak from the pulpit and the professor's chair. Much preaching and passionate utterance on social matters is based on a superstitious notion of the nature of right. The moral sense can be truly estimated only when regarded in its natural relation with the other aspects of life. To isolate anything is to distort it, and much teaching and preaching is vitiated by a too sharp sundering of the moral and the rational. The conscience is assumed to be a sort of divine ingredient in a nature otherwise unmoral or else fatally determined to the bad. Those who speak in its name too often seem to feel justified in pronouncing on complex social situations which they give no evidence of having adequately studied. They apparently do not doubt their competence to decide what rates railroads should charge, what wages they should pay their employees, and what is extortionate and what fair in many similar cases, without any considerable experience with the business in question or knowledge of the actual conditions.

Yet it remains true that the right is only the rational viewed in a certain light. It is what is on the whole, and all things con-

sidered, the wisest and best thing to be done, and what this is in complex cases can only be determined by patient and careful study. Only in simple situations is the decision easy. The possession of a monitor like the inward voice of Socrates is not an adequate equipment for an adviser of men in our complicated social and industrial life. What is right is that which does justice to the widest and highest interests involved, and, since these frequently in some measure conflict, the right can only be a conciliation. It is never something abstract to be followed, regardless of its effects on the interests involved; rather is it that which secures for all normal and legitimate human interests their maximum fulfilment. In great matters the "crippled soul" cannot do right because it does not see the total situation, because it sees but a few of the interests that must be cared for; such a one is likely to become a fanatic who may be praised a little for an upright purpose, but who must be much condemned for the social harm he is sure to do.

The Republic clearly states that in the production of the trained intelligences, who can do right because they are large enough to take into consideration the many varied interests of humanity, nature as well as education plays a part. There are some minds with which nothing can be done. After being tested and found wanting, they are quickly dropped, the philosophic natures alone being able to profit by the highest training and ultimately becoming capable of wise leadership. It would be very easy to make fun of this idea; nevertheless, it is true. Nor do we have to look very far for an illustration. In the recent history of this country a great part was played by a man who had the native qualities in question, although he did not have the advantage of an academic education. I refer to Lincoln, our supreme type of the synoptic-minded man. The men about him, with all their earnestness and acuteness, were most of them but "crippled souls," in that they were partisans, representatives of certain special or local interests and blind to all others. Lincoln felt the total situation, and was perhaps the only man in the country who could do right, because he was the only man large enough to see it. With a few more leaders like him, and fewer anti-slavery orators and Southern hot-heads, we should undoubtedly have settled

the questions of slavery and states' rights without a civil war. That is always the case. When men are not large-minded and rational, they must fight. The most eloquent denouncers of wrong are apt to be half-wrong themselves, for in promoting the interests they have at heart they are wounding others just as precious. And men who live in a world that has been evolving for ages, a world in which things get to be wrong because they are out of date, a world in which readjustments of all kinds have constantly to be made, cannot do right, whatever their intentions, until they learn to see together the many various interests involved and to patiently use evolutionary methods in promoting desirable conditions.

A similar situation confronts us today. There are men who are industriously preaching the doctrine of class consciousness, and calling upon all to line up for or against, and, if they are not checked, we may have another illustration of the ravages wrought by a superstitious moral sentiment which assumes that the good is the promotion of a single interest in the world, and not the conciliation and adjustment of all interests. Our hope for a continued peaceful social evolution depends upon the existence of a majority of sensible people, led by men of great sanity and wholeness of view.

The fact that many who are sufficiently educated to get a hearing and have their utterances printed still linger in the second stage of development comes out clearly in the current discussions concerning the relations of the individual and social life. Certain writers who start from the individual give the impression that they have not advanced beyond the position of Rousseau. The absolute individual they talk about is an abstraction, and never was on land or sea. They betray no appreciation of the fact that every civilized man is shaped by the society in which he grows up, that he is nourished on its ideals and saturated with its traditions, and that his whole higher life is social just because it is human. On the other hand, those who are emphasizing the social aspects of education, morality, and religion, not infrequently seem to have forgotten that there is no society apart from the individuals that constitute it, that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a social conscience, no conscience, that

is, which is not somebody's conscience, and no general happiness that individuals do not feel. They do not think as clearly as the boy of six who was discussing with his little sister the purpose of human life. The latter had retained in her memory some of the pious instruction given by her teachers, and when the question was put, "What are we here for?" said at once, "Why, we are here to take care of other people"; to which her still unsophisticated brother replied, "No, that cannot be; for what then are the other people here for?"

The crippled souls are prolific writers, and it will be a fortunate thing for humanity when they are offset by greater activity on the part of those who realize that the concrete human life that we know is one, that it has both its individual and its collective aspects, that this distinction exists within a living unity, and that to take it absolutely is to push men back into the old way of fighting out their problems instead of thinking them out. He who can see but one thing at a time is but a fraction of a man, and fractional men, the representatives of special interests, are socially inefficient, despite their appearance of force. They often settle conflicting claims on the field of battle, because they know of no other way of getting their claims allowed. But the man who is able to see things together is of the highest value to the state, and is the supreme type of efficiency. His mind is like a deliberative assembly in which all great human interests have representation. Because he is able to make the necessary adjustments and effect the conciliation which life requires, he makes fighting unnecessary. Understanding perfectly that society is a balance of forces, some of which are now too strong and some too weak, he will actively aid the cause that for the time needs assistance, and promote the interest that is being oppressed or overlooked. He will work with a clear head and with steadfast good will in his heart, knowing that he is not an enemy of those whom he must for the time oppose. And if, in spite of his efforts, a crisis comes, and a situation arises in which it is necessary for him to fight, he will do his duty, not as a partisan, nor as the enemy of any man, but as the real friend of all. The spirit in which he will act is that of one of Victor Hugo's heroes, who in order to protect the precious interests of society aimed his

gun at the leader of the mob, the bearer of the red flag of anarchy, and pulled the trigger, not in hate, but with tears of sorrow streaming down his face.

The philosophic nature, the synoptic-minded man (would that we had a simpler, homelier term by which to designate him!) is, therefore, not developed for contemplation only, but for wise social action. Although he will feel the blessedness of the mind's higher life, the joy of seeking and learning truth, he loses nothing of his efficiency because of the clearness and wide sweep of his vision. He is socially valuable because he knows when and where to help. He aids a cause when it is too weak and resists it when it is too aggressive.

To give a concrete illustration, a mind of this type will take a lively issue and an active part in the present controversy over the open and closed shop. Believing in the value of organized labor, he will not hesitate to oppose it in so far as he considers its principles to be wrong. In this case his course seems clear. For, stripped of all confusing associations and set in the clear light, the establishment of the closed shop means that workingmen will have to get a license from some labor organization to live in the United States. So far, the majority of wage-workers in this country have shown by their actions that they prefer to remain outside the unions, and this in spite of the persuasive arguments and coercive methods of many years. To work for the closed shop is to force these men to surrender a hardly-won freedom; it is to say to them, "You must come to terms with a certain private organization. If it permits you to live and work, very well; if not, we will not employ you, buy your goods, or accept your services in any way. Submission or death by starvation is your alternative." Stated thus simply, this seems hard, but that is what the closed shop comes to in the end.

Now the large-minded man who is compelled to oppose what he deems a mistaken, and hopes is but a temporary, policy of a great organization which in other ways is potent for good, can do so with the greatest energy. Of course he will deeply regret to seem an enemy when he is really a friend, yet he has no ill-will, since he knows that many men are still in the stage of development where they cannot understand what is not partisan,

and where they suppose that he who is against them on one point is against them all along the line. And while today he does his utmost against the closed-shop policy of organized labor, he knows that he is not opposing labor's true interest, and is well aware that at no distant date, when other issues are joined, he may find it necessary to fight for this organization. Even now he may find interests in common with it and work for them, even though his efforts are for the time not appreciated.

In a similar way he will not hesitate to oppose his friends, those whom he meets at the church or the club or in business life, if they seek to gain exclusive privileges through legislation. He will do all he can to promote the spirit of fair play that would give everybody a chance, and that jealously opposes every attempt to monopolize the market either for labor or for any of the necessities of life. Indeed, one of the most admirable things about the ideal type we are describing is the quality of his spirit. The comprehensive view goes with, and to some extent produces, a universal sympathy. While the partisan is always and everywhere a hater, the characteristic of the mind that surveys life from a sufficiently elevated point of view is geniality. It sees everything in the world with sympathy, that is, it appreciates the relative justification of the various points of view, and gladly does justice to ideas and institutions and policies that have served their purpose and have passed or are passing away. Such a one has no blind animosities or furious antagonisms. He will see the fanatic and his cause, and all around both. The attitude of the protestant, whose reason for being is the wrong he protests against, he will recognize as occasionally necessary in certain situations, but not as the normal and desirable attitude of the human spirit. And not only will he be tolerant of intolerant fanatics, but he will have deep sympathy with the great world of men and women who largely follow their instincts and traditions and do not always take their reformers seriously. For he sees clearly that this world of average men and women manages to get on, and so maintains the possibility of further development, while our race would long since have ceased to be if it had followed all its passionately earnest reformers. Such a mind is genial, because it is human and humane, and reflects in its large-

ness something of the greatness of the majestic march of life upward through the ages and of the complexity and variety of interests of the inhabitants of the great, round world.

Leadership belongs exclusively to no one group or profession, but there are two classes in which above all others it should naturally be expected,—the professional teachers of philosophy and the ministers of the liberal churches. To take the philosophers first, the present situation in this country would be depressing were it not evidently swiftly changing and were there not hope that a higher and nobler conception of philosophy's true function and ideal service will some time be attained. What is that function? What, indeed, can it be but the unification of knowledge? What service is so needed today as that of assisting young men and women to organize the detached bits of their information into some comprehensive view of the world? Mental progress consists essentially in a constant reorganization of the mental content, and the essential condition of this is a preliminary organization. It matters not so much what the first synthetic view is, provided it is flexible and capable of revision, as knowledge grows from more to more and the constructive powers develop. The philosopher ought to be the broadest man in the university, and his department is ideally the clearing house of the sciences. The students should learn in that department to seek the organic place in the one body of truth of the truths they learn in their separate studies, and to acquire the habit of seeing things together. Only in this way can the mind have a life, and be something other than a lumber-room in which each new acquisition is piled, regardless of its consistency with what is already there. Such philosophic organization and construction is a tremendous stimulus to the intellectual life. No one wants facts so much as he who wants them for the light they shed on some great problem. In this region, as in so many others, the current of interest flows downward, and interest in great questions, such as that of man's place in the cosmos, fertilizes all the sciences, and inspires and sustains research. Such an influence is needed in the university for the teachers' sake. The great teacher is a man who not only knows his subject, but sees it in its larger relations, and is able to make clear its significance for



other studies and other human interests. The young man who studies the cell-structure of a fern, or dissects the brain and nervous system of a fish would be a pitiable object if he saw no further than the poor dismembered fragments before him. What really makes such activity valuable is that the mind looks not only at the cells and fibres, but through them into the great world of organic relations, that world of which man himself is a living part. An ultimate synthetic view is the justification of his special studies.

To one who holds this conception of the nature and function of philosophy the present situation is matter for sincere regret. For instead of regarding it as their business to unify knowledge and help their students to some mental organization, some flexible progressive world-view, a large number of our philosophers are epistemologists, and consider that their main vocation is to discuss the possibility of knowledge. Now epistemology is a legitimate subject of inquiry, and logically prior to other investigations; yet it is of very subordinate importance, and this for the evident reason that it is bound to come to a positive conclusion. Otherwise it undermines its own foundations. For if the mind is not to be trusted in the creation of other sciences, it is equally unworthy of confidence when it examines the nature and conditions of knowledge. The epistemologist uses the same mind as the chemist, and, if the latter cannot attain to knowledge, neither can his critic. It may be decided that the best name for all our constructions, no matter how frequently verified, is faith rather than knowledge. The name matters little, so we are agreed upon the use of our terms. But this would not affect the point I make, for it would remain true that the chief function of the philosopher is to contribute to the organization and constant reorganization of such knowledge as we have. For him to be a narrow specialist, wasting his time in quibbles about the possibility of knowledge, is an anomaly. His great function remains unperformed, and philosophy, as he represents it, falls into deserved suspicion and discredit.

When this view is stated, some one is almost sure to say, "No one can know all science, and this conception is therefore not possible of realization." Of course, no one can know all science,

nor even all of one science, but it is perfectly possible for a diligent man to be acquainted with the leading conceptions of the various sciences and to know what their larger problems and mutual relations are, and it is precisely with these that the philosopher is concerned.

Without some such general view of life, we are like men studying a canvas a square inch at a time and never seeing the picture. It is with a life, a human society, or a world just as it is with a child's picture-puzzle: the separate and isolated parts are largely without meaning, and only when put together do they make sense.

The world has need of philosophers. They could be of great assistance to us all in helping us to a general view of life that would give meaning and dignity to its disconnected parts. And some day there will be a happy conjunction of a philosopher with the true conception of his primary function and a university president able to appreciate and willing to support him. The department they will establish in their university will not be obsessed by Kantian ideas and run after "pure knowledge *a priori*," but will return to the nobler and more useful conception held by the world's greatest thinkers generally down to what, I believe, will ultimately be recognized as the German episode in the history of philosophy. The students fortunate enough to receive instruction in this university will be conducted to a unitary and comprehensive conception of the world, and not be lost in the endless maze of *Erkenntnisstheorie*. The teachers will cherish an ideal of mental organization which may be likened to the Republic of the United States, which grows constantly with the growth in population, intelligence, and wealth of its component states and by the admission of new states. So taught, the young men and women will have a place for everything they learn. They will attain to an ordered inner life, and have some sense of the result of the ages of the growth of life and the development of thought, and some knowledge of the larger features of the vast process in which our life has an organic place.

With regard to the liberal minister, it is clear that he has a similar function, although it is to be performed for a different constituency, for the men and women whose college days are

over and who are now carrying on the world's work. They, too, need help in synthesizing and conciliating life's varied and conflicting interests. For them the churches ought to be graduate schools where they may be assisted to a great, courage-inspiring, and effort-sustaining *Weltanschauung*. Such a view of the world is not a philosophic luxury, but a practical, religious necessity, when the mind reaches a certain stage of development. When a soul in trouble exclaimed, "I will lift up mine eyes to the hills whence cometh my help," he referred to the summits of his thought, to an inspiring conception of God. This is the picturesque Hebrew way of expressing the soul's joy and strength in a great thought.

Nothing is more relevant to the present situation than this fact. In spite of the low views of truths urged upon us today and the depreciation of the importance of constructive thinking for religion, there is no successful preaching, no inspiring gospel, which does not present a sublime world-view. No one has ever succeeded who has not been able to set forth a conception that stirred the mind and fired the imagination by its grandeur. The Hebrew prophets have had the greatest influence on the religious life of the world. They were the most important factor in the transformation of the national religion of Israel into a universal religion, and their utterances, even in translation, have been the strength and consolation of the centuries. And, though they had moral passion in abundance, they were fundamentally thinkers. They were the first philosophers of history, and their utterances were lofty because their thoughts were lofty. They saw their God actively directing the destinies of nations, and conceived the unfolding of a divine purpose to be the highway of history. Amos rises to the magnificent conception of Jahveh as the world-ruling God of justice; for Hosea he is the universal Father; the first Isaiah is a statesman seeking to conform the foreign policy of his fatherland to the divine plan of which he assumes to be the interpreter; and Jeremiah reaches the thought of an inner law and a human instinct for God. The second Isaiah is literally carried away by the glory of his religious idea, and his trumpet tones calling his people to encouragement and trust thrill the reader of these far-off days.

The same principle is repeated in the history of Christianity. Paul, the great apostle, who saved the religion of Jesus from perishing as an obscure Jewish sect, who planted churches over the Graeco-Roman world, and who was a marvel of energy and activity, was inspired by his philosophy of history. For him the history of the world before Jesus was merely a time of preparation, and everything before him merely led up to the truth he had to preach.

There is, then, no such thing possible today as a religion out of relation to the intellectual conceptions of the age. Of course, it is known by all that religion is impulsive in its origin and emotional in its nature, and that, though it defends itself with arguments, it is not based on reasoning. But it is also true that there has not been any simple impulsive faith among civilized people for centuries, any faith uninfluenced by the reflective intelligence. Faith does begin in feeling, but by a law of its nature it goes on to reason, to a believed conception that remains after the critical intelligence has pruned away the superstitious elements which were associated with it in the early stages of its growth.

The man who said that he hated theology and botany but loved religion and flowers was, therefore, more epigrammatic and sensational than wise. It is pleasant to be a child, and live by impulse, habit, and authority, but when we become men we must accept thought for our portion. The poet may sing

"Backward, turn backward, O Time, in your flight,  
Make me a child again,"

but the process of life is irreversible. To reach a simple faith without any thought in it, it would be necessary to go back beyond Christianity and beyond the prophets of Israel to the world's childhood. The attempt to do this would make us not children, but sophisticated men. There is nothing for us but a rational faith, and we can have no noble feeling in the absence of great thoughts. Moreover, the distinction between the intellectual and the emotional life can be made altogether too sharp and too complete. These two aspects of our existence are in organic relation, and neither can be successfully isolated. Indeed, a common but very precious experience proves that the difference

between faith and reason may easily be exaggerated. The highest moral truths and deepest religious insights seem to grow out of a feeling or instinctive stage into clear self-consciousness. When we have had an hour with Emerson, or have heard some inspiring sermon, do we not often say that we have learned much and yet in a sense have learned nothing? For all that the teacher has helped us to see we knew before, but in us it was inarticulate and unclear. What has happened is that now we know what we meant, we see what we felt, we can say what we did not know how to utter. Perhaps the greatest service of the preacher is that he helps men to be their noblest selves. He does for his congregation what Socrates did for the youth of Athens. The old philosopher-inquisitor realized the nature of his function, for he said that while his mother was a midwife he was an accoucheur of souls.

But when our ideals are born and we see them in all their beauty, we naturally desire a view of life in which they shall appear legitimated, and we are strengthened and made happy if philosophy offers to us a conception of the world as a place congenial to these highest interests. Israel's prophets inspired the nation with a religious interpretation of history. Our corresponding problem is to give a religious interpretation to the doctrine of evolution, and to other true and approved ways of thinking concerning the world and our place therein, and thus to enable the life of aspiration to feel at home.

It is vain to try to isolate the moral and religious life from the intellectual life of our time. Neither ethical culture nor religious faith can thrive entirely apart. Both are for men in a certain situation, and what that situation is it is the function of the intelligence to determine. We do well to admire the statement of Micah, "What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with thy God?" But we must not forget the last three words, for they are essential. One may do right desperately in a universe which he believes to be indifferent or even bad, but he is a stronger as well as a happier man for a conception of the cosmos in which his passion for right has significance, and in which his love of goodness is seen to be the heart of reality coming to consciousness in him. To have

the conviction that our ideals are at home in the world that has produced them, that they are factors in evolution and guide life in the making, is to be freed from fear and assured that, as we work out our salvation, it is after all God that works in us both in the will and the deed, in the beautiful dream, the aspiration, the prayer, as well as in its realization. The synthetic view of the moral life, the religious life, and the life of thought is thus the fruitful view, and when the mind has been properly educated the three blend in one life. The attempt to ignore any one of these aspects of what is normally a concrete, organic whole weakens them all, and history shows that when religious men ignore the intellectual life of their age they relapse into mysticism and suffer mental and moral decline.

In these days certain substitutes for thought, for an inspiring outlook, have been proposed, but the help they offer is illusive. Thus we are told that there are unknown spirits who may come to us in the darkness of the subconscious regions of our life. But this suggestion is unattractive. Religion is surely something other and nobler than a subterranean or kitchen-door connection with we know not what spiritual powers. No, we must try the spirits, all spirits, as the Scripture says, and they must come to the front door of our nature and show their credentials. It is the goals of life that are divinely beautiful, and we can never worship other than our highest thought of God, the One in whom our noblest ideals are united. We look for him not in the region of the abnormal and pathological, but in the other direction, knowing well that our highest thought falls short of the reality we worship, and that the sweetest and divinest human ideal is but a lure to keep us in the path that leads to him.

It remains to show that the synoptic view of life is the religious view, and that the reason why so many feel themselves to be orphans in the world is the fragmentariness of their thought. This is best illustrated in the history of the relation of our concepts of man and the world. Long ago the distinction between them was drawn, although we have evidences of a time anterior when it was still unmade. But, once established, it was soon exaggerated, and man began to think of himself as an alien, and opposed to the world, which was then conceived of as a dead

mechanism, a piece of machinery, or as under the control of an evil spirit. For a long time religious feeling was well expressed in the old hymn,

“I’m but a stranger here ;  
Heaven is my home.  
Earth is a desert drear ;  
Heaven is my home” ;

and many who sing no hymns are oppressed by the fear or the suspicion that a materialistic philosophy will prove true, and thus negate their dearest longings and hopes.

Now in the interest of clear thinking, of wise social action, and ultimately of the religious life, it is essential that the distinction between the human and the natural be drawn with the utmost rigor. We cannot reach the third stage of human intelligence by skipping or slurring over the work of the second. There are many people who are still fascinated by the idea of a primitive natural life that never has been lived on earth, and who admonish us to follow nature without realizing that the methods of nature in the lower stages of her development can never be imitated by man. We cannot imitate her in farming or rearing our children. Her method in improving forms of life is to produce a great excess of individuals and destroy all but a few. We must understand natural processes that we may use them, but it is mere superstition to regard them as examples for human imitation.

On the other hand, the biologists have made it clear that man is no stranger here, but that he is a child of the world’s life, an organic part of the one great process, and there is every reason to believe that this is as true of his mind and spiritual nature as of his body. He is thus domesticated in the world; all that he is, and all that he aspires to be, all his heroes draw their being from this nature which men in the second stage of development considered alien or positively hostile. The result is the naturalization of religion. For the old ways of thinking, which accounted for the world on some materialistic theory, are forever impossible. No view of the world can for a moment be treated as worthy of consideration that offers no explanation of the highest product of evolution, the intellectual, social, moral, and religious life of man.

And since this life actually is, since we are absolutely compelled to regard it as an organic part, a result, of the world-process, it follows that that process must be interpreted in terms of its outcome. It was a great saying of Aristotle that "what each thing is when fully developed, when its growth has been brought to perfection, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family." And we may add that this principle holds when we are speaking of the world of which these are but parts.

We have, then, only to keep clear the distinction between man and nature and then combine them in a synoptic view, that is, see them in the organic unity which is the concrete reality and not in the opposition which is only an abstraction of thought, and the result is as much religion as philosophy. If we have no life that is not natural, then the divinest prayer of the divinest man in history is but the world-life become conscious and articulate, and as from this elevation we view the task before us, of building up, teaching, and ennobling our race, we understand perfectly how a great genius could say, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." When naturalism is thus made thorough-going, it is transfigured. It does not mean that man is swallowed up in a process that goes mechanically on, but rather that he must change his conception of that process, since he is its outcome. Put together the two things that belong together, man and the universe, and then ask what kind of a universe it is that is flowering out into a human world of thought and love and righteousness, of joy and peace and hope. A materialistic philosophy is possible only when the part of nature that lies below the realm of life and purpose is under consideration. But there is no such nature. The only nature we know is the nature that has produced and sustains human life, and the only rational way to interpret that nature is by its product and fruit rather than by its lower stages and earlier phases. If you try to study either man or nature in isolation, you necessarily fail of understanding, for both are actually parts of one organic whole. But combine them in a single view, enlarge the scope of your vision, and you attain to a religious interpretation of reality that is sublime, that conserves all values and sustains all that is dearest and most precious in humanity's faith and hope. So far from being a stranger, a



lonely wanderer in an alien universe, the philosopher-saint, with his thoughts and his aspirations, is the consummate product of the age-long process of its growth. And as we survey the world from this height, we can say with Jacob of old, "Lo, God was in this place and I knew it not."